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Abstract
This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games
in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These
structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication
graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context,
we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions
which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportional to weights deter-
mined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the
well-known Myerson value is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the
equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems
the position value coincides with the Harsanyi power solution obtained
for the influence power measure.
JEL Classification C71
Key words: Cooperative TU-game, Union stable system, Harsanyi div-
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1 Introduction
In the classical model of cooperative games with transferable utility it is
generally assumed that there are no restrictions on cooperation. However, in
practice, many situations require certain limitations on cooperation. Myerson
[20] used ideas from graph theory and studied how the outcome of a game
depends on which players cooperate with each other. This line of research
was then continued by Owen [24], Borm et al. [6], and Potters and Reijnierse
[25]. However, Myerson himself pointed out that partial cooperation can not
always be modelled by a graph. Therefore, Myerson’s communication model
has been generalized in several directions, for instance towards conference
structures by Myerson [21], hypergraph communication situations by van den
Nouweland et al. [23] and union stable systems by Algaba et al. [1, 2]. In
this paper we consider Harsanyi power solutions for union stable structures,
generalizing results of van den Brink et al. [9] who introduce this class of
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solutions for communication graph games, and results on the Myerson and
position value for union stable structures in Algaba et al. ([1],[2],[4]).
The union stable system model introduced by Algaba et al. [1, 2] assumes
that if two feasible coalitions have common elements, these will act as interme-
diaries between the two coalitions in order to establish meaningful cooperation
in the union of these coalitions. In other words, players in feasible coalitions
can communicate, so players in the intersection of two feasible coalitions make
communication in the union coalition possible. This mathematical feature is
relevant, and feasible coalition systems coming from communication graphs
([20]), permission structures ([7, 14]), systems under precedence constraints
([15]), antimatroids ([3]) and augmenting systems ([5]) verify this condition,
thus being special cases of union stable systems. Furthermore, these systems
have a close relation with the hypergraph communication situations. Recently,
Faigle et al. [16] have established union stable systems as the more general
systems where it is possible to define a meaningful notion of supermodularity
that generalizes Shapley’s original convexity model for classical cooperative
games.
To illustrate the importance of union stable systems, consider a network
of people that are in the Board of Directors of big companies. Typically,
such people are members of the board of several companies, see e.g., Mizruchi
and Bunting [19] and Conyon and Muldoon [11]. Besides the influence that
a board member has on a company, it is interesting to know what influence
board members have on each other when they are member of the board of the
same company. Or, even more interesting, what is the influence of a board
member of company A on a board member of company B, while they are in
no board together, but have a third board member who is sharing a board
with each of them. And even there can be influence without such a third
member, but more indirect relations. In general, a Board of Directors of a
company consists of more than two members, and thus the network where the
basis elements are the sets of people that belong to the board of one company
cannot be modelled by a simple graph. However, we can consider the boards
as the basis of a union stable system.
The aim of this paper is to study Harsanyi power solutions introduced
by van den Brink et al. [9] for communication graph games, in the context
where cooperation is based on union stable cooperation structures. Harsanyi
solutions are introduced and studied as solutions for TU-games in Vasil’ev
([27], [28]) and Derks et al. [12, 13]. In our context, the Harsanyi dividends
([17]) in the cooperation restricted game are distributed according to a shar-
ing system determined by a positive power measure defined for union stable
systems. Such a power measure assigns a non-negative real number to every
player which measures the power or strength of this player in the union sta-
ble system which is considered. Given a power measure, the corresponding
sharing system is defined in such way that the share vectors for any coali-
tion S are proportional to the power measure of the union stable subsystem
obtained for those feasible coalitions contained in S. Special positive power
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measures for union stable systems are the influence measure and the equal
power measure which generalizes the degree and equal power measures for
the particular case of communication graphs. We analyze these Harsanyi
power solutions, establishing that for specific power measures they coincide
with some well-known solutions in the literature. For example, on a special
class of union stable systems, denoted by USIN and defined as those that are
closed under intersection (if the intersection contains at least two elements)
and such that every non-unitary feasible coalition can be written in a unique
way as a union of non-unitary supports (this contains the class of cycle-free
communication graph situations), the Harsanyi power solution obtained for
the influence measure is equal to the position value as defined in [1] and on
the union stable family 2N coincides with the Shapley value. In addition to
this, it is interesting to notice that on the class of all union stable structures
the Myerson value ([2]) coincides with the Harsanyi solution obtained for the
equal power measure.
Generalizing the approach of van den Brink et al. [9], we provide a unified
approach by axiomatizing the Harsanyi power solutions with the same ax-
ioms except one which states that for special games on union stable systems,
we allocate the earnings proportional to some power measure for union sta-
ble systems. This shows that the essential diﬀerence will be in the measure
considered. Concretly, on the class USIN we can extend the argument in
[9] that the fundamental diﬀerence between the Myerson value and the po-
sition value is with respect to the power measure that is applied (the equal
power measure or the influence power measure) to union stable structures. In
fact, on the subclass USIN we obtain two axiomatic characterizations for the
Harsanyi power solutions using on the one hand σ-point unanimity and on
the other hand the σ-influence property which, when taking the same power
measure, are equivalent on the class USIN . On the class of all union stable
structures, σ-point unanimity implies the σ-influence property. Applying the
equal power measure and the influence power measure we obtain new char-
acterizations for the Myerson and position value for union stable structures,
respectively.
Another axiom that we use in the axiomatizations on USIN is the super-
fluous support property. Although the Myerson value satisfies the superfluous
support property on the class of all union stable structures, this is not the
case for all Harsanyi power solutions. We show that replacing the superfluous
support property by either the superfluous player property of Algaba et al. [1]
(generalizing the superfluous player property for communication graph games
of van den Nouweland [23]) or generalizing the inessential link property and
connectedness of van den Brink et al. [9], leads to characterizations on the
class of all union stable structures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the main concepts
on cooperative TU-games and union stable systems which will be used in
the following sections. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of Harsanyi
power solutions for union stable systems. In Section 4, we analyze some of
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their properties. In Section 5, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the
Harsanyi power solutions on the class USIN that generalizes the cycle-free
communication situations, using the superfluous support property. In Section
6, we provide axiomatizations on the class of all games on union stable systems
by using either the superfluous player property or the inessential support
property and connectedness which gives rise to a new axiomatization of the
Myerson value on the class of all union stable structures. Finally, in Section
7 we give some special attention to the Myerson value
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative TU-games
A cooperative transferable utility (TU)-game is a pair (N, v) where N =
{1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players and v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0, is a
characteristic function.
A distribution of the amount v(N) among the players will be represented
by a real-valued vector x ∈ Rn. Here xi represents the payoﬀ to player i
according to the involved payoﬀ vector x. A solution is a real-valued function
that assigns a payoﬀ vector to every game (N, v). A solution f satisfies the
eﬃciency principle if
P
j∈N fj(N, v) = v(N).
The most well-known solution is the Shapley value (Shapley [26]) given by
Φi(N, v) =
X
S⊆N\{i}
(n− |S|− 1)!(|S|)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)), for all i ∈ N.
For each T ⊆ N , the unanimity game uT is given by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆
S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. It is well-known that the unanimity games
uT , T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, form a basis of the vectorial space of TU-games on
N denoted by GN , and that each game v ∈ GN can be written as a linear
combination of unanimity games in a unique way: v =
P
T⊆N, T 6=∅∆v(T )uT ,
where the coeﬃcients ∆v(T ) are the Harsanyi dividends, (see Harsanyi [17]).
By applying the Möbius transformation we obtain that
∆v(S) =
X
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |v(T ), S ⊆ N.
The Shapley value belongs to the class of Harsanyi solutions, proposed
by Vasil’ev ([27], [28]), also known as sharing values, see Derks et al. [12].
First, a sharing system on N is a system p = (pS)S⊆N,S 6=∅, where pS is an
|S|-dimensional vector assigning a nonnegative share pSi ≥ 0 to every player
i ∈ S with
P
j∈S p
S
j = 1, S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. We denote the collection of all
sharing systems on N by PN . For a game (N, v) and sharing system p ∈ PN ,
the corresponding Harsanyi payoﬀ vector is the payoﬀ vector hp(N, v) ∈ Rn
given by
hpi (N, v) =
X
S⊆N, i∈S
pSi ∆v(S), i ∈ N,
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i.e., the payoﬀ hpi (N, v) to player i ∈ N is the sum over all coalitions S ⊆ N ,
containing i, of the share pSi ∆v(S) of player i in the Harsanyi dividend of
coalition S. A Harsanyi solution on GN assigns to a given sharing system p ∈
PN the Harsanyi payoﬀ vector hp(N, v) to each game (N, v). By definition,
the Harsanyi solutions are eﬃcient. The Shapley value is the Harsanyi solution
that assigns to any game (N, v) the Harsanyi payoﬀ vector hp(N, v) with the
sharing system p given by pSi =
1
|S| , S ⊆ N, i ∈ S.
2.2 Union stable systems and structures
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players and F ⊆ 2N a set system
of feasible coalitions. Union stable systems are introduced in Algaba et al.
[1]. Formally, the set system F is called union stable if for all A,B ∈ F
with A ∩B 6= ∅ it is satisfied that A ∪B ∈ F .
Many real world situations find its natural framework in these structures.
For instance, suppose that player 1 is a homeowner who wants to sell his/her
house. Player 1 has signed a contract with a real estate agent that represents
player 2. So, player 1 only can sell his/her house by means of player 2. There
are two buyers, players 3 and 4. Notice that in this economic application, the
family of feasible coalitions that can generate a surplus are only those which
make possible that the seller can sell his/her house. Therefore, the coalitions
which can trade are
F = {{1, 2, 3} , {1, 2, 4} , {1, 2, 3, 4}} . (1)
An important subclass of union stable systems are communication graphs
as considered in Myerson [20]. A communication graph game is a triple
(N, v,E), where (N, v) is a game and (N,E) is a simple graph. It is easy to
see that the set system F , defined by those coalitions which induce connected
subgraphs, is a union stable system. However, in practice, a union stable
system can not always be modelled by a communication graph (see van den
Brink [8] for a characterization of the set systems that can be obtained as
connected coalitions in a communication graph). For example, the set system
F pointed out above with one seller/two buyers and a real state agent as
intermediary, is a union stable system which cannot be the set of connected
coalitions in a communication graph. So, union stable systems not only allow
for a generalization of set systems derived from communication graphs but
also a better understanding and insight of them and their applications.
Let F be a union stable system and G ⊆ F . In order to obtain the basis of
a union stable system (see [1]), the following families are defined inductively
G(0) = G, G(n) =
n
S ∪ T : S, T ∈ G(n−1), S ∩ T 6= ∅
o
, (n = 1, 2, . . .) .
Notice that G(0) ⊆ G(n−1) ⊆ G(n) ⊆ F , since G ⊆ F and F is union
stable. We define G by G = G(k), where k is the smallest integer such that
G(k+1) = G(k).
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For each union stable family F , it is interesting to find a minimal subset
B (F) such that B (F) = F . So, the following set is well-defined:
E (F) = {G ∈ F : G = A ∪B, A 6= G, B 6= G, A,B ∈ F , A ∩B 6= ∅}.
The set B (F) = F \ E (F) , is called the basis of F , and the elements of
B (F) are called supports of F . We remark that the basis B (F) is the minimal
subset of the union stable system F such that B (F) = F (see Algaba et al.
[1]).
Let G ⊆ 2N be a set system and let S ⊆ N . A set T ⊆ S is called a
G-component of S if T ∈ G and there exists no T 0 ∈ G such that T ⊂ T 0 ⊆ S.
Therefore, the G-components of S are the maximal feasible coalitions that
belong to G and are contained in S. We denote by CG(S) the collection of the
G-components of S. Union stable systems can be characterized in terms of the
F-components of a coalition in the following way: The set system F ⊆ 2N is
union stable if and only if for any S ⊆ N with CF (S) 6= ∅, the F-components
of S are a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of S, (see [1]). So, if for every
i ∈ N, there is an S ∈ F such that i ∈ S then the F-components form a
partition of the player set N .
Let (N, v) be a cooperative game and F ⊆ 2N a union stable system.
Let B(F) be the basis of F and C(F) = {B ∈ B(F) : |B| ≥ 2}. If there is no
confusion we will just write B and C. The F-restricted game vF : 2N → R,
is defined on the player set N and is given by vF(S) =
P
T∈CF (S) v(T ). On
the other hand, the conference game is defined on the basis of a union stable
system1 (so, on player set C) and it is the game ¡C, vC¢ where vC : 2C → R, is
given by vC (A) = vA(N).
Note that the game
¡C, vC¢ is well defined since for each A ⊆ C, A is a
union stable system. The F-restricted game focuses on the role of a player
in creating economic possibilities and establishing meaningful communication
among the players, whereas the conference game measures the economic value
of the grand coalition when specific parts of the cooperation structure are
considered.
The two above definitions extend the point game (introduced by Myerson
[20]) and the arc game (introduced by Borm et al. [6]) for communication
graph games, where for a communication graph game (N, v,E) we have that
C = {{i, j} : {i, j} ∈ E}.
A union stable cooperation structure is a triple (N, v,F) where N =
{1, . . . , n} is the set of players, (N, v) is a game with v : 2N → R satisfying
v(∅) = 0, and F is a union stable system. For convenience, we assume from
now on that the underlying game (N, v) is zero-normalized, i.e., v({i}) = 0
for all i ∈ N .
1Although in the beginning of this section we mentioned that we always take as player
set N = {1, . . . , n}, the definition of the conference game is the only occasion where we
deviate from this. Note that the player set in a conference game is still derived from a
structure on N .
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The set of all union stable cooperation structures on N will be denoted
by USN = {(N, v,F) : F is union stable} .
We denote by USIN the special subclass of USN where the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(1) For all S, T ∈ F with |S ∩ T | ≥ 2 we have S ∩ T ∈ F .
(2) All non-unitary feasible coalitions can be written in a unique way as a
union of non-unitary supports.
Notice that this subclass of union stable cooperation structures generalizes
those communication graph games for which the graphs do not contain cycles.
2.3 Allocation rules for union stable cooperation structures
An allocation rule on USN is a map γ that assigns to each union stable
cooperation structure (N, v,F) a payoﬀ vector, γ (N, v,F) ∈ Rn.
Both the Myerson value and the position value are defined from the Shap-
ley value [26], but using the F-restricted game and the conference game,
respectively, which were defined in the previous subsection. The Myerson
value was introduced in Myerson [20] and later extended in [21]. Myerson
pointed out the need to generalize this model towards restricted coopera-
tion situations which can not be modelled by a graph. This idea has been
studied by van den Nouweland et al. [23] and Algaba et al. [2]. Given a
union stable cooperation structure (N, v,F), the Myerson value, denoted by
μ (N, v,F) ∈ Rn, is defined by
μ (N, v,F) = Φ ¡N, vF¢ .
The position value for communication graph situations was first intro-
duced in Meesen [18] and studied in Borm et al. [6]. This value was extended
to hypergraph communication situations in [23] and it is defined on union sta-
ble cooperation structures in [1]. Let (N, v,F) be a union stable cooperation
structure. The position value, denoted by π (N, v,F) ∈ Rn, is given by
πi (N, v,F) =
X
C∈Ci(F)
1
|C|ΦC
¡C, vC¢ , for i ∈ N.
where Ci (F) = {C ∈ C : i ∈ C}. When there is no confusion we will often
write Ci instead of Ci (F).
3 Harsanyi power solutions for union stable cooperation struc-
tures
In van den Brink et al. [9] the class of Harsanyi power solutions for commu-
nication graph games is introduced. A main purpose of the underlying paper
is to extend these solutions to the union stable cooperation structures since
above we illustrated that many networks in society cannot be modelled by a
simple graph.
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We denote the class of all union stable systems on N by UN . A power
measure for union stable systems is a function σ : UN → Rn+ that assigns to
any union stable system F , a nonnegative vector σ(N,F) ∈ Rn+, yielding the
nonnegative power σi(N,F) of player i ∈ S in the union stable system F . A
power measure is symmetric if for any union stable system F and i, j ∈ N,
S ∈ F such that i ∈ S if and only if j ∈ S we have σi(N,F) = σj(N,F).
It is positive if for any F ∈ UN , the power of player i is positive if and only
if i ∈ M for some M ∈ CF(N) with |M | ≥ 2 (or, equivalently i ∈ C for
some C ∈ C(F)). Thus, player i has zero power if i /∈ SM∈CF (N), |M |≥2M .
Throughout this paper we only consider positive power measures. For a union
stable system F and a coalition S ⊆ N , we denote by FS = {T ∈ F : T ⊆ S}
the union stable subsystem of those feasible coalitions for which all players
belong to S. Note that FS is union stable. We denote by CS the supports
with at least two players that only contains players of S.
In real life situations power or influence in union stable networks is of great
importance. In modern societies large international firms have an important
influence on society. As mentioned in the introduction, the network structure
of people that belong to the boards of firms cannot be modelled by a simple
graph, but it can be represented by a union stable system if we assume that
communication or information can reach a board member of some company
B from a board member of another company A, even when these two board
members never meet in a common board, but are ‘connected’ to each other
through other board members. The influence a board member has on society
depends not only on his/her influence on the firms where he/she is a board
member, but also on his/her influence on board members of other firms with
whom he/she is ‘connected’.
One of the best known power measures for simple graphs is the degree
measure which assigns to every player in a communication graph its number
of neighbours. This degree measure is generalized for union stable systems by
Algaba et al. [1] who define the influence of a player i by
Ii (N,F) =
X
C∈Ci
1/ |C| , (2)
where Ci = {C ∈ C : i ∈ C} is the collection of those basis coalitions that
contain player i and at least one other player. Note that in the example of
board members, according to this influence measure the power of a member
is less when he/she shares the board with more other people. In case the
influence would not depend on the number of other members in a board,
another generalization of the degree measure would just assign to every player
the number of supports which he/she belongs to, i.e., Ii (N,F) = |Ci|, i ∈ N .
Given a positive power measure σ, we define the corresponding Harsanyi
power solution ϕσ : USN → Rn on the class of games on union stable systems
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by
ϕσi (N, v,F) =
X
T⊆N, i∈T?
j∈T σj(N,FT )>0
σi(T,FT )P
j∈T σj(T,FT )
∆vF (T ).
Note that
P
j∈T σj(T,FT ) = 0 if and only if C(FT ) = ∅, in which case
∆vF (T ) = 0.
In the following, for union stable system F and coalition T such thatP
j∈T σj(N,FT ) 6= 0, we denote
pF ,Ti (σ) =
σi(T,FT )P
j∈T σj(T,FT )
.
So, the Harsanyi power solution ϕσ assigns to each union stable structure
(N, v,F) the Harsanyi solution (or sharing value) of the corresponding F-
restricted game (N, vF) where any dividend ∆vF (T ) of coalition T in the
restricted game is distributed to the players in T proportional to their powers
in FT . Observe that the shares do not matter when all powers are zero,
because that can only happen when all players of T are dummy in FT or
the only feasible coalitions of T are singletons, and thus the dividend of T
in (N, vF) is equal to zero. Therefore, for notational convenience, in the
following we take pF ,Ti (σ) =
1
|T | , for all i ∈ T whenever
P
j∈T σj(N,FT ) = 0.
In this paper we will provide axiomatizations of the Harsanyi power solu-
tions on the class USN as well as on the subclass USIN . Before doing that
we state the following lemma, generalizing a result of [9], establishing that
dividends of nonfeasible coalitions are zero.
Lemma 1 Let (N, v,F) ∈ USN be a union stable structure. Then ∆vF (S) =
0 for all S 6∈ F .
Proof. Let S 6∈ F . We prove the lemma by induction on the cardinality of
S. If |S| = 1, then ∆vF (S) = vF(S) = 0, by zero-normality. Proceeding by
induction suppose that ∆vF (T ) = 0 whenever T 6∈ F with |T | < |S|. Then,
∆vF (S) = v
F(S)−
X
T⊂S
∆vF (T )
=
X
T∈CF (S)
vF(T )−
X
T⊂S
T∈F
∆vF (T )
=
X
T∈CF (S)
X
H⊆T
H∈F
∆vF (H)−
X
T⊂S
T∈F
∆vF (T ) = 0.
¤
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4 Properties
First, we recall some standard axioms for allocation rules. An allocation rule
γ : USN → RN is called component-eﬃcient if for all (N, v,F) ∈ USN and
M ∈ CF(N), we have
P
i∈M γi (N, v,F) = v(M).
An allocation rule γ : USN → RN satisfies component dummy if for all
i /∈
S
M∈CF (N)M , we have γi (N, v,F) = 0.
An allocation rule γ : USN → RN is additive if
γ (N, v + w,F) = γ (N, v,F) + γ (N,w,F)
for all (N, v,F) , (N,w,F) ∈ USN .
Theorem 1 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power solution
ϕσ : USN → Rn is an allocation rule that satisfies component eﬃciency,
component-dummy and additivity.
Proof. Since ∆vF (S) = 0 if there is no T ∈ F such that S ⊆ T , for every
component M ∈ CF(N) we haveX
i∈M
ϕσi (N, v,F) =
X
i∈M
X
T⊆N
i∈T
pF ,Ti (σ)∆vF (T ) =
X
T⊆M
X
i∈T
pF ,Ti (σ)∆vF (T )
=
X
T⊆M
∆vF (T ) = v
F(M) = v(M),
where the second equality follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that coalitions
that contain players from diﬀerent F-components are not feasible, showing
that ϕσ satisfies component eﬃciency.
It is obvious that ϕσ satisfies component dummy since ∆vF (S) = 0 for all
S ⊆ N with i ∈ S and i 6∈ SM∈CF (N)M .
For all v, w ∈ GN and all F ∈ UN , (v + w)F (S) = vF (S) + wF(S), and
thus ∆(v+w)F (S) = ∆vF (S) +∆wF (S) for all S ⊆ N . Then
ϕσi (N, v + w,F) =
X
S⊆N, i∈S
pF ,Si (σ)∆(v+w)F (S)
=
X
S⊆N, i∈S
pF ,Si (σ)(∆vF (S) +∆wF (S))
=ϕσi (N, v,F) + ϕσi (N,w,F),
showing that ϕσ satisfies additivity. ¤
Next, we generalize point unanimity as used in Algaba et al. [4] to ax-
iomatize the Myerson value, in a similar way as the communication ability
property for communication graph games of Borm et al. [6] is generalized in
van den Brink et al. [9]. A union stable structure (N, v,F) is called point
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anonymous if there exists a function f : {0, 1, . . . , |D(F)|} → R such that
vF (S) = f (|S ∩D(F)|) for all S ⊆ N , where D (F) = {i ∈ N : Ci 6= ∅}.
When there is no confusion we will often write D instead of D (F). In [2] is
shown that the Myerson value satisfies point anonymity2. However, in general
Harsanyi power solutions do not satisfy this property.
Weakening point anonymity in a similar way as the corresponding prop-
erty for communication graph games of [6] is weakened in [9], yields point
unanimity. A union stable structure (N, v,F) is called point unanimous if it
is point anonymous with function f : {0, 1, . . . , |D|}→ R such that f (k) = 0,
for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |D|− 1}, i.e., the F-restricted game is a multiple of the
unanimity game on D. An allocation rule γ satisfies point unanimity if all
players that belong to at least one non-unitary support earn the same in any
point unanimous union stable structure, while the other players earn zero.
Using power measures for union stable systems this axiom can be generalized
in a similar way as the communication ability property for communication
graph games of [6] is generalized in [9] (using unanimous instead of anony-
mous games). So, taking into account the power or centrality of players in a
union stable system, for a given power measure σ we modify this axiom by
requiring that the payoﬀs are allocated proportional to the players’ power in
the given union stable system.
σ-point unanimity. If (N, v,F) is point unanimous, then there is α ∈ R
such that f(N, v,F) = ασ(N,F).
Observe that σ-point unanimity reduces to point unanimity when we take
the equal power measure σ = E given by
Ei (N,F) =
½
1, if Ci 6= ∅,
0, if Ci = ∅.
Alternatively, any power measure can be used such as the influence measure I
or its alternative I. Every Harsanyi power solution satisfies its corresponding
σ-point unanimity.
Proposition 1 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power so-
lution ϕσ satisfies σ-point unanimity on USN .
Proof. When (N, v,F) is point unanimous, then vF = vF (N)uD and ϕσ
is obtained by distributing the unique nonzero dividend ∆vF (N) = vF (N)
among the players in D according to the σ-measure, showing that ϕσ satisfies
σ-point unanimity. ¤
2An allocation rule γ satisfies point anonymity if all players that belong to at least one
non-unitary support earn the same in any point anonymous union stable structure, while
the other players earn zero.
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5 Axiomatic characterizations on USIN
Algaba et al. [4] axiomatized the Myerson value on the class USIN by adding
the superfluous player property to the properties of component eﬃciency,
component-dummy, additivity and point unanimity, where the axioms are
defined on the subclass USIN similar as they are defined before on USN .
The support H ∈ C is called superfluous for (N, v,F) ∈ USN if vC (A) =
vC (A \ {H}) , for all A ⊆ C, i.e., if supportH is a null player in the conference
game. An allocation rule γ : USN → RN has the superfluous support property
if γ (N, v,F) = γ
³
N, v,B \ {H}
´
, for all (N, v,F) ∈ USN and for every
superfluous support H ∈ C for (N, v,F).
It is satisfied that on the class USIN all Harsanyi power solutions satisfy
the superfluous support property.
Theorem 2 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power solution
ϕσsatisfies the superfluous support property on USIN .
Proof. Since it is assumed that any game is zero-normalized, it follows from
the definition of the F-restricted game that, if H is a superfluous support,
then vF = vB\{H}, and thus
∆vF (S) = ∆vB\{H}(S), S ⊆ N.
WhenH 6⊆ S, thenFS = (B \ {H})S and so σi(S,FS) = σi(S, (B \ {H})S)
for all i ∈ S, implying that the share of i ∈ S in ∆vF (S) is equal to the share
of i in ∆vB\{H}(S).
When H ⊆ S, then S 6∈ B \ {H} (since otherwise, if S can be written as a
union of supports in B\{H}, then in F it can be written as the union of these
supports and H), and thus ∆vB\{H}(S) = 0 by Lemma 1. So, ∆vB\{H}(S) =
∆vF (S) = 0 and the shares don’t matter. Hence
ϕσ(N, v,F) = ϕσ(N, v,B \ {H}),
showing that ϕσ satisfies the superfluous support property on USIN . ¤
Note that in the proof above it is crucial that for any (N, v,F) ∈ USIN
there cannot be a support H such that also a proper subset of H is a support
in F .3
3Consider, for example the union stable system F = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}}. Note that
(N, v,F) /∈ USIN since {1, 2, 3} is a support and it can also be written as the union of
the supports {1, 2} and {1, 2, 3}. Further, consider the unanimity game v = u{1,2,3}. Then
the influence measure on N = {1, 2, 3} yields I(N,F) = (5/6, 5/6, 1/3), so ϕI(N, v,F) =
(5/6, 5/6, 1/3). Deleting from F the superfluous support {1, 2}, we obtain the union stable
system F 0 = {{1, 2, 3}}. Now the influence measure is given by I(N,F 0) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), so
ϕI(N, v,F 0) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), showing that the outcome changed although we only deleted
a superfluous support. Also, on (N, v,F) the position value is not equal to ϕI(N, v,F) since
π(N, v,F) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
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Similar as shown for the Myerson value in [4] (i.e., for σ = E), it can be
shown that on USIN the above five axioms characterize the Harsanyi power
solution that corresponds to the power measure that is applied to σ-point
unanimity. Since the proof is similar for any Harsanyi power solution, we
state this result without proof.4
Theorem 3 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power solution
ϕσ : USIN → Rn is the unique allocation rule that satisfies component ef-
ficiency, component dummy, additivity, the superfluous support property and
σ-point unanimity.
Besides weakening the communication ability property by using point
unanimous games instead of point anonymous games, in [9] also the degree
property, used in [6] to axiomatize the position value for communication graph
games, is weakened in a similar way. The same we can do for the influence
property, defined using the influence measure discussed before (see (2)) and
used in [1] to characterize the position value for games on union stable sys-
tems. The triple (N, v,F) ∈ USN is called support anonymous if there exists
a function f : {0, 1, . . . , |C|} → R such that vC (A) = f (|A|) , for all A ⊆ C,
i.e., if the conference game
¡C, vC¢ is anonymous. The triple (N, v,F) ∈ USN
is called support unanimous if it is support anonymous with function f satis-
fying f(k) = 0, for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |C|− 1} , i.e., if the conference game ¡C, vC¢
is a multiple of the unanimity game on C.
σ-influence property. If (N, v,F) is support unanimous, then there is
α ∈ R such that f(N, v,F) = ασ(N,F).
Observe that the σ-influence property yields the (weak) influence property
when we take σ = I.5
The next lemma generalizes a result from [9] and states that (i) on the
class of all union stable structures support unanimity implies point unanimity,
and (ii) on the subclass USIN these properties are equivalent.
Lemma 2
(i) Let (N, v,F) ∈ USN . If (N, v,F) is support unanimous, then (N, v,F) is
also point unanimous.
(ii) Let (N, v,F) ∈ USIN . Then (N, v,F) is support unanimous if and only
if (N, v,F) is point unanimous.
4The proof can be obtained from the corresponding proof for the Myerson value in [4]
by applying σ-point unanimity instead of point unanimity at every occasion where this is
used.
5This weakens the influence property stating that for each (N, v,F) ∈ USN that is
support anonymous, the payoﬀs to the players are proportional to their influence. This
axiom is used in [1] to axiomatize the position value. This axiomatization still holds when
the influence property is weakened by requiring it only for support unanimous union stable
structures.
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Proof. (i) Let (N, v,F) ∈ USN be support unanimous. If D = ∅, then
C = ∅ implying that vF(S) = 0, for all S ⊆ N (by zero-normality of v),
and thus (N, v,F) ∈ USN is point unanimous. Next, suppose that D 6= ∅.
By definition of support unanimity, vC = vF (N)uC, and thus vB\{H}(N) =
vC(B \ {H}) = 0, for all H ∈ C. For T ⊆ N , we distinguish two cases.
1. Let T be such that D 6⊆ T ,
vFT (N) =
X
S∈CFT (N)
v(S) =
X
S∈CFT (T )
v(S) = vFT (T ) = vF (T ),
where the second equality follows from zero-monotonicity of (N, v) and the
fact that all players that do not belong to T are dummies in (N,FT ). From
vC = vF(N)uC, it further follows that vFT (N) = 0 since FT is a proper subset
of F . Hence
vF (T ) = vFT (N) = 0.
2. Let T be such that D ⊆ T , by definition of vF and CF (T ) = CF(N),
vF (T ) =
X
S∈CF (T )
v(S) =
X
S∈CF (N)
v(S) = vF(N).
From these two cases we conclude that vF = vF (N)uD, which proves (i).
(ii) The ‘only if’ part follows from (i). To prove the ‘if’ part, let (N, v,F) ∈
USIN be point unanimous. Note that if we delete a support H of F with
(N, v,F) ∈ USIN , then the set D 6∈ B \ {H}. Thus, if vF = vF(N)uD,
then vC(C) = vF (N) and vC(A) = vA(N) = 0, for all A ⊂ C, implying that
vC = vF(N)uC. ¤
From this lemma it immediately follows that σ-point unanimity implies
the σ-influence property whereas on the subclass USIN , σ-point unanimity
and the σ-influence property are equivalent. As a corollary from Theorem 3
and Lemma 2.(ii) we immediately obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power solution
ϕσ : USIN → Rn is the unique allocation rule that satisfies component ef-
ficiency, component-dummy, additivity, the superfluous support property and
the σ-influence property.
For σ = I, Theorem 3 generalizes the axiomatization of the position value
for communication graph games in [6], while for σ = E, this generalizes the
axiomatization of the Myerson value being a corollary from [9].
Taking the influence measure, σ = I, it follows from [1] that on USIN ,
the position value is a Harsanyi power solution.
Corollary 2 If (N, v,F) ∈ USIN then ϕI(N, v,F) = π(N, v,F).
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Corollary 2 shows that to define and compute the position value on USIN ,
we do not need the conference game, since it is a Harsanyi solution applied to
the F-restricted game (N, vF). However, for arbitrary union stable systems
the position value is not equal to ϕI as is already shown in [9] for commu-
nication graph games. Clearly, since the influence measure is symmetric, it
follows that ϕI yields the Shapley value when there are no restrictions to the
cooperation, i.e., if F = 2N . On the other hand, it is well-known that the
position value does not generalize the Shapley value in general, i.e., π(v, 2N)
need not be equal to Sh(N, v).
As further corollaries we immediately obtain axiomatizations of the My-
erson value and position value, of which some are already known.
Corollary 3 On the class of union stable cooperation structures USIN , it
holds that:
(i) The position value π : USIN → Rn is the unique allocation rule that
satisfies component eﬃciency, component-dummy, additivity, the superfluous
support property and I-point unanimity.
(ii) The Myerson value μ : USIN → Rn is the unique allocation rule that
satisfies component eﬃciency, component-dummy, additivity, the superfluous
support property and E-point unanimity.
(iii) The position value π : USIN → Rn is the unique allocation rule that
satisfies component eﬃciency, component-dummy, additivity, the superfluous
support property and the I-influence property.
(iv) The Myerson value μ : USIN → Rn is the unique allocation rule that
satisfies component eﬃciency, component-dummy, additivity, the superfluous
support property and the E-influence property.
Part (iii) is already known from [1], while part (ii) is shown in [4]. Sim-
ilarly as stated in [9] for cycle-free communication graph games, we may
conclude that both the position value and the Myerson value on USIN can
be characterized by some influence property and some point unanimity prop-
erty. Therefore, the diﬀerence between them is in the power measure that is
used. For the position value this is the I-influence measure, whereas for the
Myerson value it is the E-influence measure.
Let USUN ⊂ USN be the class of support unanimous union stable struc-
tures. Next, we show that on this class the position value is equal to the
Harsanyi power solution for the I-influence measure.
Proposition 2 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power so-
lution ϕσ : USUN → Rn is the unique allocation rule that satisfies component
eﬃciency, component dummy and the σ-influence property.
Proof. Let (N, v,F) ∈ USUN be a support unanimous union stable struc-
ture. If D = ∅, the payoﬀs are determined by component-dummy. Suppose
that D 6= ∅. Then ϕσ (N, v,F) = ασ(N,F) by the σ-influence property. Let
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γ (N, v,F) be another allocation rule satisfying component eﬃciency, compo-
nent dummy and the σ-influence property. As (N, v,F) is a support unani-
mous union stable structure, γ (N, v,F) = βσ(N,F). In order to prove that
β = α, let M ∈ CF(N).
Applying component-eﬃciency, it holds that
P
i∈M γi (N, v,F) = v(M) =P
i∈M ϕ
σ
i (N, v,F) . Therefore,
P
i∈M βσi(N,F) =
P
i∈M ασi(N,F). Hence,
it is satisfied (β − α)
P
i∈M σi(N,F) = 0. Since
P
i∈M σi(N,F) 6= 0 if M ∈
CF(N), we have that β = α. Thus, γ (N, v,F) = ϕσ (N, v,F). ¤
Since the position value satisfies the I-influence property (see [1]), we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4 For every support unanimous union stable structure (N, v,F),
we have π (N, v,F) = ϕI (N, v,F) .
6 Axiomatic characterizations on USN
Since Harsanyi power solutions do not satisfy the superfluous support prop-
erty on the class of all union stable structures, in order to provide an axiomatic
characterization on the class of all union stable structures we will introduce
other axioms and provide two axiomatizations. The first one generalizes the
corresponding axiomatization of Harsanyi power solutions for communication
graph games given in van den Brink et al. [9], the second one extends an ax-
iomatization of the Myerson value for games on union stable systems studied
in Algaba et al. [2].
An allocation rule γ : USN → RN satisfies the inessential support property
if, for every union stable system F , c ∈ R, T ∈ F with T 6= ∅, and H ∈ C
such that H 6⊆ T, we have
γ (N, cuT ,F) = γ
³
N, cuT ,B \ {H}
´
.
The inessential support property yields that given a unanimity game on a
nonempty feasible coalition T , the solution does not depend on those supports
which contain at least a player outside of coalition T . In other words, the
essential supports for the unanimity games on a nonempty feasible coalition
T are those whose agents are all in T .
An allocation rule γ : USN → RN satisfies connectedness if γ (N, v,F) =
γ (N,w,F) whenever vF = wF . Connectedness means that the solution only
depends on the feasible coalitions.
Proposition 3 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power so-
lution ϕσ : USN → Rn satisfies the inessential support property and connect-
edness.
Proof. In order to prove the inessential support property, let v = cuT , c ∈ R,
with T ∈ F , T 6= ∅ and H ∈ C such that H 6⊆ T . Since T ∈ B \ {H},
∆vF (T ) = ∆vB\{H}(T ) = c and ∆vF (S) = ∆vB\{H}(S) = 0, for all S 6= T .
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In addition to this, (T,FT ) =
³
T,
³
B \ {H}
´
T
´
, and thus
σ (T,FT ) = σ
³
T,
³
B \ {H}
´
T
´
.
Therefore,
ϕσ (N, v,F) = ϕσ
³
N, v,B \ {H}
´
,
showing that ϕσ satisfies the inessential support property.
Connectedness holds straightforward since ∆vF (S) = ∆wF (S), for all S ⊆
N , whenever vF = wF . ¤
Using these two properties we obtain the following axiomatic characteriza-
tion of the Harsanyi power solutions on USN , generalizing the corresponding
result of [9].
Theorem 4 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power solu-
tion ϕσ : USN → Rn is the unique allocation rule that satisfies component
eﬃciency, component-dummy, additivity, σ-point unanimity, the inessential
support property and connectedness.
Proof. It follows from Theorems 1 and Propositions 1 and 3 that ϕσ is an
allocation rule that satisfies the six properties on USN . To show uniqueness,
let (N, v,F) ∈ USN and let γ : USN → Rn be an allocation rule that satisfies
the above properties.
To prove uniqueness, as γ is additive and the game (N, v) is zero-normalized,
it is suﬃcient to show that for all T ⊆ N with |T | ≥ 2, and β ∈ R,
γ (N,βuT ,F) is uniquely determined. To prove this, fix T ⊆ N with |T | ≥ 2.
We distinguish two cases:
1. Suppose that T ∈ F . Then (βuT )F = βuT . From the inessential
support property, γ (N,βuT ,F) = γ (N,βuT ,FT ) . Moreover, (N,βuT ,FT ) is
a point unanimous union stable structure. So, σ-point unanimity yields that
there exists α ∈ R such that
γ (N,βuT ,F) = γ (N,βuT ,FT ) = ασ(N,FT ).
Applying eﬃciency, it holdsX
i∈T
γi (N,βuT ,F) =
X
i∈T
ασi(N,FT ) = α
X
i∈T
σi(N,FT ) = β,
and thus α = β?
i∈T σi(N,FT ) . We conclude that
γi (N,βuT ,F) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
βσi(N,FT )P
i∈T σi(N,FT )
, if i ∈ T,
0, otherwise,
and thus, γ (N,βuT ,F) = ϕσ (N,βuT ,F).
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2. Suppose that T /∈ F . Let S = {S ∈ F : T ⊂ S} be the collection of
feasible subsets of N that contain T , and let cR ∈ R, R ∈ S, be such that,
(βuT )
F =
X
R∈S
cRuR
(see van den Brink et al. [10] to determine cR ∈ R and R ∈ S).6 Applying
Case 1 to each feasible coalition R ∈ S, it is satisfied that
γ (N, cRuR,F) = ϕσ (N, cRuR,F) .
By additivity of γ and ϕσ it follows that γ (N,βuT ,F) = ϕσ (N,βuT ,F).
Again by additivity, γ (N, v,F) = ϕσ (N, v,F). ¤
As the Myerson value is the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power
measure on USN , as a result we get a new characterization for the Myerson
value on USN .
Corollary 5 The Myerson value μ : USN → Rn is the unique allocation
rule that satisfies component eﬃciency, component-dummy, additivity, E-
point unanimity, the inessential support property and connectedness on USN .
Algaba et al. [2] provide an axiomatization of the Myerson value using the
superfluous player property, generalizing a result for communication graph
games in van den Nouweland [22]. A player i ∈ N is called superfluous
for (N, v,F) ∈ USN if vF(S) = vF (S \ {i}) , for all S ⊆ N , i.e., it is a
null player in the F-restricted game (N, vF ). An allocation rule γ satisfies
the superfluous player property if for all (N, v,F) and every player i ∈ N
that is superfluous for (N, v,F) it holds γ (N, v,F) = γ ¡N, v,FN\{i}¢, where
FN\{i} = {F ∈ F : F ⊆ N \ {i}} .
It can be shown in a similar way that every Harsanyi power solution
satisfies this property.
Theorem 5 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power solution
ϕσ : USN → Rn satisfies the superfluous player property.
Proof. Let i ∈ N be a superfluous player in (N, v,F). We have to prove
ϕσ (N, v,F) = ϕσ ¡N, v,FN\{i}¢. Since i is a null player in the game (N, vF),
ϕσi (N, v,F) = 0. Since i 6∈
S
M∈CFN\{i}(N)
M , by ϕσ satisfying component
dummy we have ϕσi
¡
N, v,FN\{i}
¢
= 0.
For the other players it is suﬃcient to show that vF(S) = vFN\{i}(S), or
equivalently that vF (S \ {i}) = vFN\{i}(S) for all S ⊆ N , whenever i is a
superfluous player in (N, v,F). Since CF (S \ {i}) = CFN\{i}(S), we have
vF (S\{i}) =
X
T∈CF (S\{i})
v(T ) =
X
T∈CFN\{i} (S)
v(T ) = vFN\{i}(S), for all S ⊆ N.
6Although [10] is about games on union closed systems, the proof is the same.
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In [2] (Theorem 3.7) the Myerson value is axiomatized by component
eﬃciency, component dummy, additivity, the superfluous player property and
point anonymity. Again, in the proof of uniqueness point anonymity is applied
only to point unanimous games, and thus point anonymity can be weakened
to point unanimity. But then, whenever point unanimity is applied we can as
well apply σ-point unanimity, yielding the following theorem which we state
without proof.
Theorem 6 Let σ be a positive power measure. The Harsanyi power solu-
tion ϕσ : USN → Rn is the unique allocation rule that satisfies component
eﬃciency, component-dummy, additivity, the superfluous player property and
σ-point unanimity.
Lemma 3.6 of [2] states that for every allocation rule that satisfies com-
ponent eﬃciency, component-dummy, additivity and the superfluous player
property, the payoﬀ allocation to any game on a union stable system equals
the payoﬀ allocation assigned to the F-restricted game on the same union
stable system. But then it satisfies connectedness. So, replacing the inessen-
tial support property by the superfluous player property in Theorem 4, also
we can do without connectedness.
7 The Myerson value
Next, we make some remarks on some special properties of the Myerson value
as developed in [4]. First, although in [4] only point unanimous games are
used, the Myerson value does satisfy point anonymity. However, in general,
Harsanyi power solutions do not satisfy σ-point anonymity (stating that in
a point anonymous game on union stable system the payoﬀs are allocated
proportional to power measure σ), as already follows from [9] for communica-
tion graph games. Second, in [4] an axiomatization of the Myerson value by
component eﬃciency, component-dummy, additivity, point unanimity and the
strong superfluous support property is given. This last property states that
the payoﬀ allocation does not change after deleting a superfluous support.
This property implies the superfluous support property, and therefore is not
satisfied by all Harsanyi power solutions, since they already do not satisfy the
superfluous support property on USN , in general.
We end this section with an example illustrating the solutions mentioned
in this paper.
Example 1 Consider the player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the union stable sys-
tem given by F = {{1, 2} , {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3, 4} , N} . Let v : 2N → R be defined
by v = u{1,2,3}, for all S ⊆ N. Then,
B = C = {{1, 2} , {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3, 4}} .
Notice that vF = u{1,2,3} and (N, v,F) /∈ USIN since N ∈ F and it can
be written as the union of the supports {1, 2} ∪ {2, 3, 4} as well as the union
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of the supports {1, 2, 3} ∪ {2, 3, 4}, i.e., the non-unitary feasible coalition N
does not admit a unique expression as a union of non-unitary supports. Note
that the second condition which defines the subclass of union stable structures
USIN is not satisfied either since {1, 2, 3}∩{2, 3, 4} = {2, 3} /∈ F . Computing
the Myerson value, the position value, the Harsanyi power solution obtained
for the E-influence measure and the Harsanyi power solution obtained for
the I-influence measure, we obtain
μ (N, v,F) =ϕE (N, v,F) =
µ
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0
¶
.
π (N, v,F) =
µ
11
36
,
13
36
,
10
36
,
2
36
¶
.
ϕI (N, v,F) =
µ
5
12
,
5
12
,
2
12
, 0
¶
.
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